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The interbank money market plays a key role in the execution of monetary policy.
Hence, it is important to know the functioning of this market and the determin-
ants of the interbank money market rate. In this paper, we develop an interbank
money market model with a heterogeneous banking sector. We show that besides
for balancing daily liquidity °uctuations banks participate in the interbank market
because they have di®erent marginal costs of obtaining funds from the central bank.
In the euro area, which we refer to, these cost di®erences occur because banks have
di®erent marginal cost of collateral which they need to hold to obtain funds from
the central bank. Banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries
between the central bank and banks with relatively high marginal costs. The neces-
sary positive spread between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate
is determined by transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank market, total li-
quidity needs of the banking sector, costs of obtaining funds from the central bank,
and the distribution of the latter across banks.
Zusammenfassung
Der Interbankenmarkt hat eine zentrale Bedeutung fÄ ur die DurchfÄ uhrung der Geld-
politik. Daher ist es wichtig, die Funktionsweise dieses Marktes und die Determin-
anten des Interbankenmarktzinssatzes zu verstehen. In diesem Beitrag entwickeln
wir ein Modell mit einem heterogenen GeschÄ aftsbankensektor. Traditionell wird die
Existenz des Interbankenmarktes damit erklÄ art, dass Banken einen Markt benÄ otigen,
um tÄ agliche LiquiditÄ atsschwankungen auszugleichen. Wir zeigen, dass ein Interb-
ankenmarkt auch dann entsteht, wenn sich die Grenzkosten der Kreditbescha®ung
bei der Zentralbank zwischen den GeschÄ aftsbanken unterscheiden. Im Euroraum, auf
den sich dieser Beitrag bezieht, sind diese Kostenunterschiede auf unterschiedliche
Kosten der Besicherung von Zentralbankkrediten zurÄ uckzufÄ uhren. Dabei fungieren
Banken mit relativ niedrigen Grenzkosten als IntermediÄ are zwischen der Zentral-
bank und Banken mit relativ hohen Grenzkosten. Die dafÄ ur notwendige positive
Di®erenz zwischen dem Interbankenmarktzins und dem Zentralbankzins wird durch
die Transaktionskosten und das Kreditrisiko im Interbankenmarkt, den aggregier-
ten LiquiditÄ atsbedarf des Bankensektors, die Kosten der Kreditbescha®ung bei der
Zentralbank sowie deren Verteilung Ä uber die Banken bestimmt.
JEL classi¯cation: E43, E52, E58, G21




The interbank money market, and here especially the market for unsecured overnight
loans, plays a crucial role in the conduct of monetary policy. It is the starting point
for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy impulses, and in most industri-
alized countries, the rate on these overnight loans is the central bank's operating
target. Hence, for the conduct of monetary policy it is important to know the
functioning of this market and the determinants of the interbank money market
rate.
The interbank money market reallocates the liquidity originally supplied by the
central bank. One reason for this reallocation is the o®set of anticipated and non-
anticipated daily liquidity imbalances. Furthermore, banks are motivated to take
part in the interbank market for speculative purposes. This paper derives an addi-
tional reason for banks to participate in the interbank money market: a heterogenous
banking sector. Banks have di®erent marginal cost of obtaining funds from the cent-
ral bank. In the euro area, these cost di®erences occur because marginal opportunity
cost of collateral, which banks need to hold to obtain funds from the central bank,
vary across countries within the euro area (HÄ amÄ alÄ ainen 2000). Developing an inter-
bank market model capturing this aspect, we show that in this case intermediation
occurs. Banks with relatively low marginal cost act as intermediaries between the
central bank and credit institutions with relatively high marginal cost.
This intermediation has important rami¯cations for the conduct of monetary policy
as the following example shows. The main re¯nancing operations (MROs) are the
Eurosystem's key instrument to provide liquidity to the banking sector in the euro
area. The MROs are credit transactions with a two week maturity which are ex-
ecuted weekly either through a ¯xed or variable rate tender.1 In the past, several
MROs were characterized by underbidding behaviour2 which led to a sizeable in-
crease in the interbank money market rate. This underbidding behaviour occurred
when banks expected the central bank to lower interest rates within the maturity
of the respective MRO. The extremely low demand for funds at the central bank
1Some information on the MROs are given in section 2. For a detailed description of the MROs
and the other monetary instruments of the Eurosystem see, for example, ECB 2002c. However, it
should be noted that the Eurosystem will change its operational framework. For details concerning
the intended alterations see ECB 2003a.
2Underbidding behaviour is characterized by an assessment of actual liquidity needs of the
banking sector in the euro area, considering smooth provisions of required reserves (see ECB
2002b for details).
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can be attributed to speculation on behalf of the banks and to a reduced incentive
to intermediate (for a theoretical analysis see Neyer 2003). The Eurosystem could
have prevented the strong increase in the interbank market rate by providing the
necessary additional liquidity. But usually the Eurosystem did not want to o®set the
liquidity de¯cits in order to drive home the point that underbidding behaviour is a
non-pro¯t-making strategy for the banks (see, for example, ECB 2001a p. 16). This
kind of \education" may work to prevent banks from speculating, but obviously, it
does not help to prevent a reduced incentive to intermediate. Therefore, if interme-
diation plays an important role in the interbank market, this kind of \education"
will be fruitless.
Obviously, a bank will only act as an intermediary if there is a positive spread
between the interbank market rate and the central bank rate. Empirical studies
con¯rm this positive spread for the euro area (see Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebu-
laev 2002; Ejerskov, Moss, and Stracca 2003; Ayuso and Repullo 2003). How-
ever, whereas Ayuso and Repullo take the positive spread as a support for their
assumption of an asymmetric objective function of the Eurosystem, we argue that
the positive spread is due to a heterogenous banking sector. Banks face di®erent
marginal cost of obtaining funds from the central bank. With the help of our in-
terbank market model, we derive the following determinants of the spread between
the interbank market rate and the central bank rate: transaction costs and credit
risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, collateral's
opportunity costs, and the distribution of the latter across banks.
The bulk of related literature analyzes the U.S. federal funds market. Developing a
model in which individual banks compare the liquidity bene¯t of excess reserves with
the federal funds rate, Ho and Saunders (1985) derive di®erent federal funds demand
functions and provide several explanations for speci¯c features of the federal funds
market. Clouse and Dow (2002) model the reserve management of a representative
bank as a dynamic programming problem capturing main institutional features of
the federal funds market to discuss the e®ects of various changes to the operating
environment and monetary policy instruments. A huge part of the literature dealing
with the federal funds market analyzes why the federal funds rate fails to follow a
martingale within the reserve maintenance period, i.e. why banks obviously do
not regard reserves held on di®erent days of the maintenance period as perfect
substitutes (see, for example, Hamilton 1996; Clouse and Dow 1999; Fur¯ne 2000;
Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati 2001, 2002a).
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However, Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2002b) demonstrate that explanations for
key behavioural features of the U.S. federal funds rate cannot be used for explaining
the behaviour of the short term interest rates in other countries, but that country
speci¯c central banks' operating procedures play a crucial role in determining this
interbank rate.3 This is re°ected by a number of papers considering typical fea-
tures of the Eurosystem's operational framework. Capturing main characteristics
of this framework, an extensive number of papers deals with the causes and con-
sequences of the banks' under- and overbidding behaviour in the MROs (see, for
example, Ayuso and Repullo 2001, 2003; Bindseil 2002; Ewerhart 2002, Ewerhart et
al 2003, Nautz and Oechssler 2003, and Neyer 2003). P¶ erez-Quir¶ os and Rodr¶ ³guez-
Mendiz¶ abal (2001) construct a model where the interest rates of the Eurosystem's
two standing facilities play a crucial role in determining the behaviour of the interb-
ank market rate within a reserve maintenance period. VÄ alimÄ aki (2001) presents an
interbank market model to analyze the performance of alternative ¯xed rate tender
procedures.
Our paper contributes to the literature by modelling an interbank money market
with a heterogenous banking sector. Banks di®er in marginal cost of obtaining
funds from the central bank because they have di®erent marginal opportunity cost
of holding collateral which implies that intermediation occurs. Our analysis allows
us to o®er an explanation for the observed positive spread between the interbank
market rate and the central bank rate in the euro area.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives some institu-
tional background information on the interbank money market in the euro area and
presents some stylized facts about the spread between interbank market and cent-
ral bank rates. Section 3 models an interbank money market with a heterogenous
banking sector, and section 4 summarizes the paper.
2 The Interbank Money Market in the Euro Area
Institutional Background
In the euro area, liquidity needs of the banking sector mainly arise from two factors:
the so-called autonomous factors as banknotes in circulation and government de-
3For a detailed comparison of the Eurosystem's and the Federal Reserve System's operational
frameworks, for example, see Ruckriegel and Seitz 2002. Bartolini and Prati (2003), also com-
paring the two central banks, focus on the di®erent approaches to the execution of the monetary
policy.
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posits with the Eurosystem and minimum reserve requirements. The Eurosystem's
minimum reserve system requires credit institutions to hold a ¯xed amount of com-
pulsory deposits on the accounts with the Eurosystem. For ful¯lling these reserve
requirements, averaging provisions are allowed over a one-month reserve mainten-
ance period.4 The bulk of these liquidity needs (about 74 %) are satis¯ed by the
Eurosystem through the MROs. About 26 % of the liquidity needs are met through
longer-term re¯nancing operations, less than 1 % through ¯ne-tuning operations.
Finally, residual liquidity needs (only about 0.4 %) are balanced by the banks' re-
course to the marginal lending facilities.5 The key instrument of the Eurosystem
to provide liquidity to the banking sector in the euro area, the MROs, are credit
transactions with a two-week maturity which are executed weekly. They are con-
ducted either as a ¯xed rate or a variable rate tender.6 From the launch of the euro
in January 1999 until June 2000, tenders were conducted exclusively as ¯xed rate
tenders. Since then, only variable rate tenders with a minimum bid rate have been
used. For our analysis it is important that the MROs have to be based on adequate
collateral.7 Although di®erences in the ¯nancial structure across Member States of
the EMU have been considered when de¯ning the list of eligible assets, marginal
costs of collateral vary across countries within the euro area (HÄ amÄ alÄ ainen 2000).
The liquidity supplied by the Eurosystem is reallocated via the interbank money
market. This market can be divided into the cash market, the market for short-
term securities and the market for derivatives.8
The cash market consists of the unsecured market, the repo market and the foreign
exchange swap market. In the unsecured market, activity is concentrated on the
overnight maturity segment. The reference rate in this segment is the Eonia (Euro
Overnight Index Average). It is a market index computed as the weighted average
of overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken by a representative panel of
banks. The same panel banks contributing to Eonia also quote for Euribor (Euro
4For a detailed description of the current Eurosystem's minimum reserve system see, for ex-
ample, ECB (2002c). However, the Eurosystem will change the timing of the reserve maintenance
period. For details concerning the intended alterations see ECB (2003a).
5For a detailed description of the demand for and the supply of liquidity in the euro area see
ECB (2002b). The data given in this paragraph are averages over the period from January 1999
until December 2001. Source: ECB (2002b).
6The Eurosystem will change its operational framework. Inter alia, it will shorten the maturity
of the MROs from two weeks to one week. For details concerning the intended alterations see ECB
2003a.
7Eligible assets have been de¯ned by the Eurosystem. For details see ECB (2002c, p. 38-50).
8For more detailed information on the euro money market we refer the reader to ECB 2001b,
2002a, 2003b.
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Interbank O®ered Rate). Euribor is the rate at which euro interbank term deposits
are o®ered by one prime bank to another prime bank. This is the reference rate for
maturities of one, two and three weeks and for twelve maturities from one to twelve
months.9
The market for short term securities includes government securities (Treasury bills)
and private securities (mainly commercial paper and bank certi¯cates of deposits).
In the market for derivatives, typically interest rate swaps and futures are traded.
The purpose of our paper is to show that due to cost di®erences between banks in
obtaining funds from the central bank intermediation occurs. Looking at the euro
area, one obtains the most obvious hint of intermediation when considering that
only a fraction of all banks actually takes part in the MROs.10 A further hint would
be an on average positive spread between the interbank market rate and the rate
banks have to pay at the central bank. The following empirical analysis shows that
the spread is signi¯cantly positive.
Money Market Rate and ECB Rate: Test of the spread
The spread between the interbank market rate and the rate banks have to pay at
the central bank has been examined in a number of recent publications (for example
Ayuso and Repullo 2003; Ejerskov, Moss, and Stracca 2003; Nyborg, Bindseil, and
Strebulaev 2002). While the positiveness of the spread is not explicitly tested in
the latter two publications, Ayuso and Repullo ¯nd a signi¯cantly positive spread.
Our test di®ers from Ayuso and Repullo's in the interest rates used to approximate
the interbank market rate and the central bank rate as well as in the samples used
for the analysis. We started our analysis by comparing the key central bank rate in
the euro area, i.e. the ¯xed rate applied to the ¯xed rate tenders and the minimum
bid rate applied to the variable rate tenders, with the key interbank money market
rate, i.e. the Eonia. Our sample of daily observations ranges from 4 January 1999
to 23 September 2003, resulting in 1232 observations. The data are drawn from
9For more information on these reference rates see www.euribor.org.
10At the end of 2000 for example, 2,542 credit institutions in the euro area ful¯lled the criteria
for participating in the main re¯nancing operations, but in 1999 and 2000 the total number of
institutions which actually took part in these operations °uctuated between 400 and 600 (ECB
2001c, p. 63). Also in 2001 and 2002 the number of banks taking part in the MROs was relatively
small: it °uctuated between 175 and 658, on average 357 banks took part in the MROs.
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ECB sources11. Figure 1 shows the Eonia and the respective MRO-rate. The spread



















































































Figure 1: Eonia and MRO-rate, i.e. the
rate applied to the ¯xed rate tenders and the













































































Figure 2: Spread between the Eonia and the
MRO-rate, i.e. the rate applied to the ¯xed
rate tenders and the minimum bid rate of the
variable rate tenders.
Obviously, the Eonia has usually been close to the MRO-rate, except for some
infrequent spikes which coincide with some special episodes in the sample period.
These are:
² Underbidding episodes in February, April and October 2001, December 2002
and March 2003. More underbidding episodes occurred (April 1999, November
2001 and June 2003), but they did not lead to tight conditions in the interbank
market and thus had no signi¯cant e®ect on the Eonia.
² Anomalous allotment on 18 September 2001, the week following the terrorist
attack in the US.
² End of year and cash changeover e®ects.
² End of reserve maintenance periods e®ects. The allowance of averaging provi-
sions of required reserves over a reserve maintenance period typically results in
a strong activity in the interbank market on the last days of the maintenance
period and a relatively high corresponding change in the Eonia on that days.
² Periods between the governing council's announcement of an interest rate
change and its implementation.
11Time series are available on the ECB website www.ecb.int.
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Testing for a positive spread, we excluded these periods from the sample because
our goal is to test the positiveness of the spreads under \normal" conditions. Fur-
thermore, we restrict the sample to the days of settlement of the MROs so that
the results of the tests are comparable to the following tests of the Euribor spread.
The ¯rst column of table 1 reports the one-sided test of the null hypothesis of a
non-positive spread against the alternative of a positive spread between the Eo-
nia and the MRO-rate. The average spread was 10.5 basis points during the ¯xed
tender period and fell to 6.2 basis points during the variable tender period. The null
hypothesis of a non positive spread can be rejected on a con¯dence level of 1%.
However, this test involves two potential biases that might a®ect the spread. First,
the MROs have a two-week maturity which implies that the MRO-rate has a positive
term premium when compared to the Eonia which refers to overnight transactions.
This should bias the spread downwards. Second, di®erences in credit risk may bias
the spread upwards since the MROs are collateralized while the Eonia refers to
unsecured interbank market transactions.12 In order to reduce the ¯rst bias, we
used the two-week Euribor for testing whether the spread is positive. The two-week
Euribor has the same maturity as the MROs, thus the term premiums should be
equal. Due to the fact that the two-week Euribor is available only since 15 October
2001, we also employed the one-week Euribor, which is available since January 1999,
giving a much larger sample while the di®erence in maturity is only one week. The
data on the one-week and two-week Euribor is available on www.euribor.org. The
second bias should generally be small, since the Eonia and the Euribor are only
o®ered to banks of ¯rst class credit standing. Additionally, we did not compare the
respective Euribor with the minimum bid rate but with the weighted average rate
during the variable rate tender period. The reason is that the latter is the more
appropriate rate when comparing the actual costs of re¯nancing in the interbank
market with those at the central bank. Figures 3 and 4 show the one-week and
two-week Euribor spreads.
















































































Figure 3: Spread between one-week Euribor
and the MRO-rate, i.e. the rate applied to the
¯xed rate tenders and the weighted average
































































Figure 4: Spread between two-week Euribor
and the MRO-rate, i.e. the rate applied to the
¯xed rate tenders and the weighted average
rate of the variable rate tenders.
For testing the Euribor spreads we restrict the sample to the days of settlement of
the MROs13 and additionally exclude the same special episodes as for the test of the
Eonia spread. The second and third column of table 1 report the one-sided tests
of the null hypothesis of a non-positive spread against the alternative of a positive
spread. The average one-week Euribor spread was 13.1 basis points during the ¯xed
rate tender period and fell to 3.1 basis points during the variable rate tender period.
The average two-week Euribor spread was 1.8 basis points. For all cases the null
hypothesis of a non positive spread can be rejected on a con¯dence level of 1%.
Eonia 1-week Euribor 2-week Euribor
FT VT F+V FT VT F+V VT
Mean 0.105 0.062 0.076 0.131 0.031 0.064 0.018
(t-stat) (6.807) (11.131) (11.864) (8.901) (8.042) (9.885) (3.647)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 61 127 188 61 125 186 74
Table 1: Tests using days of settlement, special events exluded. The interest rate data in
the ¯rst block correspond to the Eonia spread while the second and third block show the one-week
and two-week Euribor spread. Tests are reported for the ¯xed rate tender period (FT), the variable
rate tender period (VT) and for both periods combined (F+V). Two-week Euribor data is only
available for part of the variable rate tender period. Each column reports the sample mean, its
t-statistic, the p-value of the one-sided test of the null hypothesis mean · 0 against the alternative
mean > 0 and the sample size N. During the variable rate tender period the Eonia is compared
with the minimum bid rate while the respective Euribor is compared with the weighted average
rate.
13We restrict the sample to the days of settlement of the MROs because using daily data for the
Euribor would imply that the maturity of the respective interbank term deposits would be longer
than the maturity of the respective MRO.
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To check for robustness of the spreads, we also tested the Eonia spread and the two
Euribor spreads using daily data, with and without the exclusion of special events.
Results are presented in the appendix. We can also reject the null hypothesis of a
zero spread for all cases on a 1% level.
The next section develops an interbank market model explaining this positive spread
between interbank market and central bank rates to be due to cost di®erences
between banks of obtaining funds from the central bank.
3 A Simple Model of an Interbank Money Market
Liquidity Costs and Optimization
We consider a continuum of measure one of risk-neutral, isolated, price taking banks.
All banks have the same given liquidity needs summarized by the variable R.14 To
cover its liquidity needs, a single bank can borrow liquidity from the central bank
or in the interbank market, where it can also place excess liquidity.
The amount of credit bank i borrows from the central bank at the given rate l is
denoted with Ki ¸ 0.15 This credit transaction with the central bank has to be
based on adequate collateral. We assume that rate of return considerations induce
a strict hierarchy of a bank's assets,16 and that assets which can serve as collateral
have a relatively low rate of return. A reason may be speci¯c criteria eligible assets
have to ful¯ll. Consequently, the collateralization of central bank credits incurs
increasing marginal costs. This opportunity cost of holding collateral is given by
Qi = qiKi + f(Ki); (1)
where f(Ki) ¸ 0, f(0) = 0, f0 ¸ 0, f00 > 0, and f0(R) < 1. The bank speci¯c
parameter qi ¸ 0 represents di®erent levels of marginal opportunity costs between
14In our model, the interbank market function of balancing daily liquidity °uctuations could
be considered by modelling liquidity needs R as a bank-speci¯c random variable or by adding
bank-speci¯c shocks. However, this would make the analysis more complicated without changing
the main result of this paper.
15We do not model explicitly the tender procedures by which credit transactions between the
Eurosystem and banks in the euro area are executed. This would not change the main results of
our paper but it would make the analysis much more complex. We focus on the main point for
our analysis: in the euro area, a single bank can cover its liquidity needs either by borrowing from
the central bank or in the interbank market where it can also place excess liquidity.
16This approach can be compared with the one by Blum and Hellwig (1995). They consider a
bank with deposits and equity. The bank can put these funds into loans to ¯rms, government bonds
or reserves of high powered money. Blum and Hellwig assume that rate of return considerations
induce a strict preference for loans over bonds and for bonds over reserves.
12IWH IWH IWH
banks (functions, variables, and parameters not indexed by i are the same for each
bank). This heterogeneity among banks is a key feature of our model.
In the interbank money market, a bank can demand credit or place excess liquidity.
Bank i's net position in the interbank market is given by
Bi = R ¡ Ki Q 0: (2)
Trading in the interbank market, the bank faces transaction costs given by
Zi = zh(Bi); (3)
where h(Bi) ¸ 0, h(0) = 0, h0(Bi > 0) > 0, h0(Bi < 0) < 0, h0(0) = 0, h00(Bi) > 0,
h0(R) < 1, and the parameter z > 0. Furthermore, we assume the cost function
to be symmetric, i.e. h(Bi) = h(¡Bi). This approach of increasing marginal trans-
action costs can be compared with the common method of modelling the liquidity
role of reserves, which posits that banks incur increasing costs when liquidity devi-
ates from a target level (see, for example, Campbell 1987; Bartolini, Bertola, and
Prati 2001). The convex form re°ects increasing marginal costs of searching for
banks with matching liquidity needs and those resulting from the need to split large
transactions into many small ones to work around credit lines.
De¯ning l as the interest rate on the central bank credit, and e as the interbank





Kil + Bie + Qi + Zi if Bi ¸ 0
Kil + Biep + Qi + Zi if Bi < 0:
(4)
If Bi < 0, the bank places excess liquidity in the interbank market at the rate e.
Since credit transactions in the interbank market are uncollateralized, there is a
credit risk which is captured by p, with 0 < p < 1, denoting the given average
probability of success of interbank credits. Bank i minimizes total liquidity costs by
choosing the optimal level of Ki, subject to Ki ¸ 0. The ¯rst order conditions are
given by
l + qi + f
0 = e + zh
0 if 0 · K
opt
i · R; (5)
and
l + qi + f
0 ¡ zh




Equation (5) represents the ¯rst order condition of a bank covering its liquidity
needs R in the interbank market and at the central bank (0 < K
opt
i < R), at the
central bank only (K
opt
i = R) or in the interbank market only (K
opt
i = 0). In the
former two cases, the marginal cost of central bank funds is equated to the marginal
cost of funds borrowed in the interbank market. In the latter case, the marginal
cost of covering R at the central bank is higher or equal to the marginal cost of
borrowing R in the interbank market. Equation (6) shows the ¯rst order condition
of a bank which borrows more reserves than R from the central bank. In this case,
the sum of the marginal cost of central bank funds and marginal transaction costs
in the interbank market is equated to the marginal revenue in the interbank market.





i;0·Ki·R(e;l;qi;R). Using the implicit function theorem we ¯nd that
K
opt
i;R<Ki (¢) and K
opt












f00 + h00 < 0:
The credit risk (1 ¡ p) introduces non-di®erentiable points in the optimal demand
function K
opt





i;R<Ki (¢) = K
opt
i;0·Ki·R(¢) = R and solving for qi:
qa = ep ¡ l ¡ f
0(R) (7)
qb = e ¡ l ¡ f
0 (R): (8)
A third non-di®erentiable point qc is found by setting K
opt
i;0·Ki·R (¢) = 0 and solving
equation (5) for qi:
qc = e ¡ l + zh
0 (R) ¡ f
0 (0): (9)
Thus, the banks' optimal credit demand K
opt






> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
K
opt
i;R<Ki (¢) if 0 · qi < qa
R if qa · qi < qb
K
opt
i;0·Ki·R (¢) if qb · qi · qc
0 if qc < qi:
Figure 1 illustrates this result. If qi ¸ qc, bank i will cover its total liquidity needs in
the interbank market, i.e. K
opt
i (¢) = 0 and Bi = R, because for any Ki the marginal
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Figure 1: Optimal Credit Demand at the Central Bank
cost of the central bank credit exceeds the marginal cost of funds borrowed in the
interbank market.
If qb < qi < qc, bank i will partially cover its liquidity needs at the central bank and
in the interbank market, i.e. 0 < K
opt
i (¢) < R and 0 < Bi < R.
If qa · qi · qb, bank i borrows exactly the amount from the central bank which
covers its own liquidity needs, i.e. K
opt
i (¢) = R and Bi = 0. It does not borrow more
funds since expected interest earnings in the interbank market are not su±cient to
cover its costs, and it does not borrow less reserves at the central bank because
covering liquidity needs in the interbank market is more expensive. This perfectly
inelastic behaviour of K
opt
i (¢) between qa and qb is due to the credit risk in the
interbank market (1 ¡p) which implies that interest cost per unit (e) and expected
interest earnings per unit (ep) fall apart.
If qi < qa, the bank borrows more reserves from the central bank than it actually
needs to cover its own requirements, i.e. K
opt
i (¢) > R. Its opportunity cost of holding
collateral is relatively small, so that it is advantageous to borrow from the central
bank to place liquidity in the interbank market.
Since qi ¸ 0, equations (7) to (8) reveal the obvious result that the interest rate in
the interbank market must strictly be greater than the central bank rate (e > l).
In ¯gure 1, the slope of the K
opt
i (¢) curve between 0 and qa as well as between qb
and qc has been chosen arbitrarily. Its exact shape depends on the form of the cost
functions f(Ki) and h(Bi).
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Equilibrium Interbank Market Rate
At the equilibrium interbank market rate e¤, liquidity supply in the interbank market
equals liquidity demand. Therefore, assuming that qi is distributed in the interval
[0;qmax] across banks according to the density function g(qi) = G0(qi) with G(0) = 0,























a = e¤p ¡ l ¡ f0(R), q¤
b = e¤ ¡ l ¡ f0(R), and q¤
c = e¤ ¡ l + zh0(R) ¡ f0(0).
The ¯rst line of equation (10) shows liquidity supply in the interbank market, the
second liquidity demand of which the ¯rst integral represents demand by credit
institutions covering partially their liquidity needs in the interbank market, whereas
the second shows the demand of banks covering their total liquidity needs in that
market. Equation (10) gives us the determinants of e¤ and therefore of the spread
e¤ ¡ l: transaction costs, the opportunity cost of holding collateral, the average
credit risk in the interbank market, total liquidity needs R, and the distribution of






























































































A¢ R 0: (14)
Equation (11) shows that an increase in the central bank rate leads to an even
stronger increase in the interbank market rate. The reason is that a rising l leads
to a likewise increase in the marginal cost of borrowing funds from the central bank
(see equations (5) and (6)). Consequently, aggregate supply in the interbank market
decreases whereas aggregate demand increases, implying the interbank market rate
to rise to restore the market equilibrium. However, due to the credit risk (1 ¡ p)
in the interbank market a rising e does not lead to a likewise but smaller increase
in the marginal revenue of the supplying banks (see equation (6)). Therefore, to
restore optimality, @e=@l > 1.
Equation (12) reveals a positive relationship between the interbank market rate e
and the credit risk in the interbank market (1 ¡ p). The intuition is obvious: an
increase in (1 ¡ p) leads to a reduction in the marginal revenue of banks placing
liquidity in the interbank market. Consequently, credit supply will decrease, leading
to an increase in e.
There is also a positive relationship between the interbank market rate e and total
liquidity needs R.17 On the one hand, rising liquidity needs imply that the credit
supply in the interbank market decreases since the supplying banks cover their
additional needs by demanding more funds at the central bank and by reducing
their supply in the interbank market (using equation (6) and employing the implicit
function theorem reveals that @K
opt
i;R<Ki(¢)=@R < 1). On the other hand, an increase
in R leads to an increase in the credit demand in the interbank market since the
respective banks cover their additional liquidity needs by demanding more liquidity
at the central bank and in the interbank market (using equation (5) and employing
the implicit function theorem reveals that @K
opt
i;0·Ki·R(¢)=@R < 1). A decreasing
supply and an increasing demand obviously lead to a rising rate e.
The e®ect of transaction costs on the interbank market rate is ambiguous.18 Rising
transaction costs in the interbank market imply increasing marginal costs of the
supplying banks. However, rising transaction costs do also lead to a decrease in














and therefore @e¤=@R > 0:
18The ¯rst integral in equation (14) is positive since h0 < 0 whereas the second integral is
negative since here h0 > 0.
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demand since covering liquidity needs at the central banks becomes more favourable.
It depends on the form of the cost functions f(Ki) and h(Bi) which e®ect outweighs
and thus whether there is a decrease or increase in e.
The main ¯ndings of this section are summarized by the following result:
Result: If the opportunity cost of collateral, which banks need to hold to obtain
funds from the central bank, di®er between banks, an interbank market will emerge.
Banks with relatively low opportunity costs will act as an intermediary between the
central bank and banks with higher costs. The interbank market rate will be higher
than the central bank rate, with the di®erence being determined by total liquidity
needs of the banking sector, average credit risk in the interbank market, transaction
costs, the opportunity cost of holding collateral, and the distribution of the latter
across banks.
Illustration: Quadratic Cost Functions and Uniform Distribution
In order to illustrate the result of this paper graphically, we postulate the cost
functions to be quadratic:












with the parameters s;z < 0. Furthermore, we assume a uniform distribution of qi,
with g(qi) = 1. In this case, we can draw ¯gure 2, re°ecting the equilibrium in the
interbank market.
In panel (b), the upward sloping curves represent marginal cost of borrowing from
the central bank given by
MCCB = l + qi + sKi (17)
for di®erent levels of marginal opportunity costs captured by qi. Since there is a
continuum of banks di®ering in qi, there is a continuum of marginal cost curves
between l and (l + qmax). The solid downward sloping curve shows marginal costs
of borrowing in the interbank market which are



























Figure 2: Interbank Market Equilibrium
whereas the dotted curve represents marginal revenue of placing liquidity in that
market given by
MR = ep + zR ¡ zKi: (19)
These two curves are the same for each bank.
For banks with qi > q¤
c marginal cost of borrowing from the central bank are always
higher than of borrowing in the interbank market. Consequently, in this case K
opt
i =
0. For banks with q¤
c > qi > q¤
b, 0 < K
opt
i < R, i.e. they partially cover their liquidity
needs at the central bank and in the interbank market. The bank-speci¯c amount of
central bank credit K
opt
i is determined by the intersection of the respective marginal
cost curves. For banks with q¤
a · qi · q¤
b, K
opt
i = R, i.e. these institutions cover
exactly their own liquidity needs at the central bank, whereas credit institutions
with qi < q¤
a borrow more reserves, i.e. K
opt
i ¸ R, to place the excess liquidity
in the interbank market. The bank-speci¯c amount of credit is determined by the
intersection of the respective upward sloping marginal cost curve and the downward
sloping marginal revenue curve.
The interbank rate e is determined by the intersection of the speci¯c marginal cost
curve (q¤
b + l + sK
opt
i ) and the interbank marginal cost curve. (At this intersection,
K
opt
i = R. Replacing K
opt
i by R in equation (18) reveals this result.)
Panel (a) represents aggregate demand and supply of liquidity in the interbank
market, assuming a uniform distribution of qi. The shaded area to the left of the
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vertical qi-axis represents aggregate supply, the respective area to the right aggregate
demand. In equilibrium, both areas have to be of the same size. If at a rate e
aggregate supply is smaller than aggregate demand, for example, e will increase,
leading to an increase in qa, qb, and qc, until both areas are of the same size.
4 Summary
For the conduct of monetary policy it is important to know the functioning of
the interbank money market and the determinants of the interbank money market
rate. Developing a simple interbank money market model with a heterogenous
banking sector we show that besides for balancing daily liquidity °uctuations or for
speculative purposes, banks enter the interbank money market because they di®er
in marginal cost of borrowing funds from the central bank. These cost di®erences
imply that banks with relatively low marginal costs act as intermediaries between
the central bank and credit institutions with relatively high marginal costs. This
results in a positive spread between the interbank market and central bank rate. The
determinants of this spread are: transaction costs and credit risk in the interbank
market, total liquidity needs of the banking sector, collateral's opportunity costs,
and the distribution of the latter across banks.
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Appendix: Testing Eonia and Euribor Spreads for Di®erent Samples
Tables 2 to 4 report one-sided tests of the null hypothesis of a non-positive spread
against the alternative of a positive spread using di®erent samples.
Eonia 1-week Euribor 2-week Euribor
FT VT F+V FT VT F+V VT
Mean 0.095 0.067 0.076 0.134 0.030 0.064 0.021
(t-stat) (14.958) (24.739) (27.432) (16.569) (17.657) (19.466) (8.822)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 293 627 920 293 620 913 369
Table 2: Tests using daily data, special events exluded. The interest rate data in the
¯rst block correspond to the Eonia spread while the second and third block show the one-week
and two-week Euribor spread using daily data respectively. Tests are reported for the ¯xed rate
tender period (FT), the variable rate tender period (VT) and for both periods combined (F+V).
Two-week Euribor data is only available for part of the variable rate tender period. Each column
reports the sample mean, its t-statistic, the p-value of the one-sided test of the null hypothesis
mean · 0 against the alternative mean > 0 and the sample size N. During the variable rate tender
period the Eonia is compared with the minimum bid rate at the MROs while the Euribor rates
are compared with the weighted average MRO rate. Special episodes are excluded for all spreads.
Eonia 1-week Euribor 2-week Euribor
FT VT F+V FT VT F+V VT
Mean 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.122 0.034 0.062 0.024
(t-stat) (3.907) (6.589) (7.627) (9.514) (7.031) (10.587) (4.646)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 76 169 245 76 167 243 99
Table 3: Tests using days of settlement, special events included.
Eonia 1-week Euribor 2-week Euribor
FT VT F+V FT VT F+V VT
Mean 0.065 0.075 0.072 0.136 0.031 0.064 0.022
(t-stat) (6.326) (12.938) (14.027) (16.743) (14.119) (19.522) (7.666)
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N 382 827 1209 382 816 1198 483
Table 4: Tests using daily data, special events included.
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